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Introduction 
In advance of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s March 2015 address to the 
US Congress, an editorial in the conservative Washington Times commented: 
 
Mr Netanyahu has the opportunity to talk in plain speech with no equivocation 
about the threat that Iran, armed with the Islamic bomb, poses to the survival of 
the Jewish state and perhaps the United States as well. Perilous times call for 
strong measures, and these are perilous times.1 
 
In 2006-07, a slew of books was released with provocative titles such as The Nuclear 
Jihadist and Allah’s Bomb. A few years earlier, journalists such as Jim Hoagland of the 
Washington Post asked if Pakistan would be able to ‘say no to rich Islamic countries 
such as Saudi Arabia and Libya when they offer to buy an Islamic bomb?’2 However, it 
was in the late 1970s that revelations about an ‘Islamic bomb’ – a nuclear weapon 
originating in Pakistan but which would allegedly be proliferated to other Muslim states 
because of the bonds of faith – came to the fore. These became tied to stories about 
Pakistani metallurgist Abdul Qadeer Khan’s role in appropriating nuclear technology 
from Europe, thus ensuring the religious and clandestine elements of Pakistani nuclear 
ambitions became the dominant, intertwined public narratives. These real and imagined 
revelations about Islamabad’s atomic aspirations energised the media in a way that the 
more pedestrian details of non-proliferation diplomacy had not.  
																																																								
1 ‘The World in Peril’, 2 March, 2015, The Washington Times, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/mar/2/editorial-benjamin-netanyahu-to-expose-obamas-iran (accessed 3 
March, 2015) 
2 ‘Nuclear Deceit’, 10 November, 2002, W[ashington] P[ost], B7	
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Despite this, there has been little historiographical investigation into 
governmental responses to the issue.3 In order to fill this gap, this article investigates 
how the American and British governments – the two actors actively trying to prevent 
Pakistani acquisition of nuclear capability in the 1970s – responded to the meme 
between 1977 and 1980, arguing that while the concept generated considerable public 
heat, policymakers saw it as lacking in merit and much more of a propaganda issue that 
an imminent reality. In our post-9/11 world, infused with Islamophobia, the War on 
Terror’s legacy, and apprehension about Islamic nuclear terrorism, asserting that fear of 
pan-Muslim nuclear capability was insignificant seems counter-intuitive.4 Indeed, there 
is an impressive body of historical research that demonstrates the importance of cultural 
factors in the Cold War era and, more specifically, nuclear policies.5 However, an 
analysis of official archives from 1977-80 indicates the ‘Islamic bomb’ scare’s lack of 
meaningful influence on policy. 
																																																								
3 For journalistic investigations, see David Armstrong and Joseph Trento, America and the Islamic Bomb: The 
Deadly Compromise (Hanover: Steerforth Press, 2007), 89-91; Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear 
Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the A. Q. Khan Network (London: Hurst & Co., 2006); 
Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins, The Man From Pakistan: The True Story of the World’s Most Dangerous 
Nuclear Smuggler (New York: Hachette, 2007); Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the 
United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons (New York: Walker & Co., 2007); Al Venter, Allah’s 
Bomb: The Islamic Quest For Nuclear Weapons (Guilford: Lyons Press, 2007); and Steve Weissman and Herbert 
Krosney, The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East (New York: Times Books, 1981). 
Academic studies addressing the issue include those by cultural anthropologist Hugh Gusterson in ‘Nuclear Weapons 
and the Other in the Western Imagination,’ Cultural Anthropology, 14:1 (February, 1999), 111-143, 125-26; physicist 
Pervez Hoodbhoy in ‘Myth Building: The “Islamic Bomb,”’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (June, 1993), 42-49; 
policy analyst Rodney W. Jones in Nuclear Proliferation: Islam, the Bomb, and South Asia (Beverly Hills: Sage, 
1981); and political scientist Samina Yasmeen in ‘Is Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb an Islamic Bomb?,’ Asian Studies 
Review, 25:2 (June, 2001), 201-215. The mainstay of analysis is over whether or not Pakistan’s nuclear programme 
was ‘Islamic’, and does not delve into Western responses. 
4 See Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (New York” St Martin’s Press, 
2004) for a typical example of alarmist analysis of the atomic terror threat. For more reasoned analyses, see Charles 
Ferguson and William Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism (Monterey: Center for Nonproliferation Studies 
2004) and Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Islam and the Bomb: Religious Justification for and Against Nuclear Weapons 
(Cambridge: Belfer Center, 2011). 
5 Matthew Jones, After Hiroshima: The United Sates, Race, and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945-1965 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2010); Shane J. Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic 
Supremacy from World War II to the Present (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010); and George 
Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact On Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1999). On religion, see Dianne Kirby (ed.), Religion and the Cold War (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003); Philip 
Muehlenbeck (ed.), Religion and the Cold War: A Global Perspective (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2012); 
Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (New York: Anchor 
Books, 2012), 411-600. 
	 4	
To demonstrate this, this article assesses the ‘Islamic bomb’ scare and 
investigates how policymakers in Washington and London responded to it. By so doing, 
this article demonstrates that although the ‘Islamic bomb’ was present in official 
discussions of Pakistan’s nuclear programme, understandings were more nuanced than 
in public discourses. There were those in officialdom who emphasised the possibility of 
an ‘Islamic bomb’, but on the whole the American and British governments concluded 
that there was little – if any – evidence to back up these accusations. In the media, the 
‘Islamic bomb’ threat became the reality, even if that reality was largely a manufactured 
one. Similar to the phrase ‘weapons of mass destruction’ in the run-up to the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, the deployment of the words ‘Islamic bomb’ became ritualised within 
the media.6 
The meme wove together religion, geography, and ideology at a time when 
Islam was becoming the dominant signifier of the vague territory that is the Middle 
East.7 What originated as a nuclear programme catalysed by India and Pakistan’s 
regional, South Asian conflict grew and metamorphosed into a construct encompassing 
a vast swathe of territory, including Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, central 
Africa, and Libya. The common factor amongst this diverse set of territories was their 
perceived belonging to the imagined community of the ‘Islamic world’. The ‘Islamic 
bomb’ therefore took Pakistan’s nuclear programme and splashed it across a 
geographical arc from the mountains of South Asia to the deserts of North Africa, 
putting Islamabad’s atomic ambitions into a trans-continental context. The meme was 
also a vessel containing not just alleged Muslim nuclear unity, but Libya’s anti-Western 
‘fanaticism’, Iraq’s socialist Ba’athism, Iran’s revolutionary ideology, Pakistan’s 																																																								
6 See Ido Oren and Ty Solomon, ‘WMD, WMD, WMD: Securitisation through ritualized incantation of ambiguous 
phrases’, Review of International Studies, 41:2 (April, 2015), 313-336. 
7 Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East Since 1945 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001), 200. 
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military-Islamic thinking, and Middle Eastern terrorism. The ‘Islamic bomb’ implied a 
common identity that challenged Western interests, eliding nuanced understandings of 
the manifest differences between states, the ideological positions of their leaders, and 
their national desires. 
During the Cold War, there were pro-American and pro-Soviet states, states 
representing various Islamic sects, and states – such as Libya and Pakistan – vying for 
leadership positions within the Muslim world. Pakistan used its nuclear programme to 
make itself unique, nuclear weapons forming part of a quest for regional leadership 
based on religious community.8 For Pakistani leaders Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and 
Mohammad Zia ul-Haq the ‘Islamic bomb’ legitimised the nationalist reasoning behind 
the nuclear programme.9 National security and a political desire for nuclear power were 
the main driving forces, but the rhetoric allowed both leaders to present Western non-
proliferation efforts as anti-Muslim, not just anti-Pakistani. This is not, however, to 
assert a hard division between the sacred and the secular. As Husain Haqquani notes, 
since its founding Pakistan has found itself in tension between ‘mosque and military.’10 
Islam remains a fundamental component of Pakistani identity, often a means of 
differentiating itself from India.11 Bhutto in particular aimed to remodel Pakistan’s 
image in foreign eyes, emphasising his socialist ideals and ties with the Muslim world.12 
Zia emphasised Islam’s role in political and civil society, striving to mould Pakistan to 
his vision of an Islamic state and appealing to the military, harder-line Islamic radicals, 
																																																								
8 Yasmeen, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb’, 202. 
9 Ibid, 202-203. 
10 Husain Haqquani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2005). 
11 Aparna Pande, ‘Foreign Policy of an Ideological State: Islam in Pakistan’s International Relations’ (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Boston, 2010), xi. 
12 Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 
97-98. 
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and widespread anti-Indian sentiment.13 As Andrew Rotter observes, US policymakers 
viewed Pakistan’s Muslims as fellow monotheists – contrasting with polytheist, 
‘depraved’ Indian Hinduism – who were ‘manly, energetic, and tough-minded in the 
face of the Communist threat.’14 Moreover – although the relationship was frequently 
rocky – Washington saw Islamabad as the more reliable partner into the 1970s.  
Beyond the situation of Pakistan, two key contexts surround the outcry over the 
‘Islamic bomb’. Firstly, there were the American and British attempts to derail 
Pakistan’s nuclear programme. After India’s May 1974 nuclear test, Washington and 
London grew concerned about the threat of an atomic-armed Pakistan. Thus, the two 
governments campaigned to prevent Islamabad acquiring a plutonium producing 
nuclear fuel reprocessing plant from France, achieving success in 1978 when Paris 
publically announced the deal’s cancellation. By this stage a more pressing concern had 
appeared. Beginning in late 1977, Britain had fed information to US president Jimmy 
Carter’s administration about Pakistan’s orchestration of a global purchasing campaign 
to procure the materials for uranium enrichment centrifuges. Although America – once 
Carter’s subordinates had been convinced that the purchasing programme was a genuine 
threat – and Britain made efforts to prevent Pakistani acquisition of uranium enrichment 
capacity, the skilful Pakistani planning, the recalcitrance of key nuclear supplier states, 
and the difficulties inherent in enforcing vague international standards for nuclear trade 
hampered these efforts.15 Pakistan’s covert procurement activities eventually – on May 
28, 1998 – allowed it set off five nuclear explosions beneath the hills of Balochistan. 
																																																								
13 Ibid, 99. 
14 Andrew J. Rotter, ‘Christians, Muslims, and Hindus: Religion and U.S.-South Asian Relations, , 1947-1954’, 
Diplomatic History, 24:4 (Fall 2000), 593-613; Andrew J Rotter, ‘Saidism Without Said: Orientalism and U.S. 
Diplomatic History,’ The American Historical Review, 105:4 (October, 2000), 1214. 
15 Malcolm Craig, ‘The United States, the United Kingdom, and Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The Case of 
Pakistan, 1974-1980’ (Ph.D. dissertation, Edinburgh, 2014). 
	 7	
The second major context was Iran’s February 1979 Revolution and the rise of 
modern, political Islam. The Revolution (a popular uprising that caught the Carter 
administration completely off-guard and drove Shah Reza Pahlavi, America’s 
staunchest regional ally, from power) dramatically brought a new form of political 
Islamic radicalism to Western public attention. The ‘loss’ of Iran dramatically altered 
America’s strategic, regional position, while the later hostage crisis and violent 
misunderstandings rooted in misconceptions about US attitudes negatively influenced 
public perceptions of Islam.16 Armed radicals stormed the Al-Masjid al-Haram in 
Mecca, igniting pan-Islamic protests when rumours circulated that the United States and 
Israel were behind the defilement of Islam’s holiest site. The most serious protest was 
the burning of the US Embassy in Islamabad, where a Marine Corps guard was killed. 
Occurring in the month American hostages were taken in Tehran, Carter’s national 
security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski feared that the situation was becoming one of 
America versus Islam.17 It was in this atmosphere – with Islam apparently growing in 
power – that the ‘Islamic bomb’ surfaced. Driven by Pakistani rhetoric, the media’s 
ritualisation of the phrase, Israeli and Indian pressure, and increased Islamic militancy, 
1979 saw the fear of Muslim nuclear weapons invigorate public debate about Pakistani 
atomic aspirations. 
 
Public Reactions 
Writing from prison after his 1977 ouster by the military, Bhutto claimed that Pakistan 
was near to a nuclear breakthrough, asserting, ‘The Christian, Jewish, and Hindu 																																																								
16 Douglas Little, ‘The Cold War in the Middle East: Suez Crisis to Camp David Accords’, in Odd Arne Westad and 
Melvyn P. Leffler, The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 325; Kambiz GhaneaBassiri, A History of Islam in America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
303; Fawaz Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests? (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999) 7-8. 
17 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981 (New York: 
Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983), 484. 
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civilizations have this [nuclear] capability. The communist powers also possess it. Only 
the Islamic civilization was without it, but that position was about to change.’18 During 
1978, Bhutto’s usurper Zia linked nuclear technology and Islamic faith, stating, ‘[T]he 
Jews have got it. Then why should Pakistan, which is considered part of the Muslim 
world, be deprived of this technology?’ and, ‘No Muslim country has any [nuclear 
weapons]. If Pakistan possesses such a weapon it would reinforce the power of the 
Muslim world,’19 The visit of Libyan representatives to Islamabad in mid-August 
prompted comment on a potential Pakistani-Libyan nuclear alliance and, if the French 
cancelled the reprocessing plant contract, cooperation in building such a facility.20 
 Western media did not popularise the ‘Islamic bomb’ until the Iranian 
Revolution’s tumultuous aftermath. A pivotal moment was the West German ZDF 
television channel’s March exposure of Khan’s theft of centrifuge designs from the 
multinational Urenco plant in the Netherlands. ZDF proposed that ‘radical Arab 
countries,’ like Libya ‘whose hatred of Israel and all those who desire peace in the 
Middle East is well known’ financed Pakistan.21 From ZDF’s programme onwards, the 
‘Islamic bomb’ became a media trope with the conspiracy theory emerging from the 
genuine conspiracy of Pakistan’s covert attempt to gain enrichment capability. 
Drawing on the ZDF report, the US media repeatedly placed the Pakistani 
programme within a pan-Islamic context.22 CBS television painted an apocalyptic 																																																								
18 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, If I Am Assassinated, www.bhutto.org/books-english.php (accessed 1 May 2013), 151, 
originally published by Vikas Press, New Delhi, 1979. From 1972-77, Bhutto made no mention of any Islamic 
dimension to Pakistan’s nuclear programme. See Ashok Kapur, Pakistan’s Nuclear Development (Beckenham: 
Croom Helm, 1987), 181. 
19 Burdess to Wilmshurst, ‘Pakistan: Reprocessing Plant,’ May 15, 1978, [Kew] T[he] N[ational] A[rchives of the 
United Kingdom] F[oreign and] C[ommonwealth] O[ffice Records] 96/822, 1; U[nited] S[tates] E[mbassy] 
Islamabad to S[tate] D[epartment], ‘Nuclear Reprocessing’, 6 August 1978, The National Security Archive electronic 
briefing book T[he] U[nited] S[tates and] P[akistan’s] Q[uest for the] B[omb], Doc.11. 
20 Islamabad to FCO, ‘Further Visit of Libyan Vice-President to Pakistan: 15-17 August,’ 17 August 1978, TNA 
FCO96/823. 
21 ‘Pakistan: Nuclear,’ 2 April 1979, TNA FCO96/950; Transcript of ZDF broadcast, appended to Carter to Granger, 
‘Pakistan,’ 20 April 1979, TNA FCO37/2203, 2-3. 
22 ‘Pakistan Denies it is developing Nuclear Arms,’ WP, 9 April 1979, front page; ‘Arms sales to Pakistan Urged to 
Stave Off A-Bomb There,’ WP, 6 April 1979, A7; ‘How Pakistan Ran the Nuke Round the End,’ N[ew] Y[ork] 
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picture of Middle Eastern nuclear warfare where ‘reliable’ informants proffered 
information that led reporter Bill McLaughlin to contend that, ‘Libya wants it [a 
Pakistani nuclear weapon] to be the nuclear sword of the Moslem world. And Pakistan 
not only has close relations with Libya, it is also deeply committed to the Palestine 
Liberation Organization.’23 Observers in Washington and London concluded that 
McLaughlin’s informants were quite likely Israeli.24 
 In Britain, the media and MPs speculated about Muslim nuclear proliferation. 
The liberal Guardian unquestioningly referenced an ‘Islamic bomb’ in multiple stories 
on the Pakistani programme and the Khan imbroglio.25 The publicity prompted MPs to 
ask awkward questions in parliament. Leo Abse, Frank Allaun, Bob Cryer, Jim 
Marshall, David Stoddart, and Tam Dalyell – all from the Labour Party’s anti-nuclear 
grass roots – queried British involvement in the scandal and government approaches to 
the Pakistani problem.26 Abse was most vocal initially, asking the new Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher if she was aware that the Khan Affair had brought the possibility of 
an ‘Islamic bomb’ that would subvert the Western position with Middle Eastern oil 
producers that much closer?27 Thatcher remained silent regarding Islamic nuclear 
weapons posing a threat to the West’s status. 
 In Washington, Senators and members of Congress brought the meme into their 
debating chambers. William Edwards (D-CA) and Fortney Stark (D-CA) had news 
																																																																																																																																																																		
T[imes], 29 April 1979, E5; ‘Arms Sales to Pakistan Urged to Stave Off A-Bomb There,’ WP, 6 August 1979, A7; 
‘Pakistan: The Quest for Atomic Bomb [sic],’ WP, 27 August 1979, A1. 
23 Transcript of CBS Evening News, ‘Special Report on the Pakistani-Islamic Bomb, part 2,’ broadcast 12 June 1979, 
TNA FCO96/956, 2. 
24 Pakenham to Alston, ‘Nuclear Pakistan,’ June 25, 1979, TNA FCO37/2206. 
25 ‘Zia uninterested in N-weapons, says Desai,’ T[he] G[uardian], 22 June 1979, 6; ‘Dutch step up inquiry after 
security slip which ‘gave hydrogen bomb to Pakistan,’’ TG, 22 June 1979, 6; ‘Security breach ‘cover-up’ at uranium 
plant,’ TG, June 29, 1979, 3. 
26 TG, 22 June 1979; TG, 29 June 1979. 
27 Leo Abse, House of Commons Debate, 3 July 1979, Hansard Online 
hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1979/jul/03/tokyo-summit-meeting#S5CV0969P0_19790703_HOC_223 
(accessed May10, 2013). 
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items on the ‘Islamic bomb’ read into the record.28 Lester Wolff (D-NY) – in an angry 
debate on the Libyan business connections of president Carter’s wayward brother Billy 
– argued that Libya was ‘bankrolling Pakistan's nuclear development program with an 
eye to acquiring an “Islamic bomb”.’29 
 Official Pakistani protests did little to curtail speculation. Having previously 
utilised ‘Islamic bomb’ language, senior figures in Islamabad recognised their rhetoric’s 
danger in the febrile atmosphere. Officials denied that the now implicitly admitted 
nuclear programme was anything other than an enterprise created by and for the 
Pakistani state. Zia cryptically commented to the BBC, ‘It does not mean that Pakistan 
one day will make a bomb and it will fly it off [sic] in an umbrella to its Arab friends 
and say here is the bomb, now throw it down the drain. How can that be done?’30 The 
media reporting infuriated Pakistani minister of foreign affairs Agha Shahi, who 
repudiated connections between the Islamic world and the nuclear project, contending 
that the media commentary represented part of an anti-Pakistani campaign.31 An 
editorial followed in the semi-official Pakistan Times railing against the ‘Islamic bomb’ 
as a ‘Western created myth’ that was ‘part of the process of rallying the non-Islamic 
world against the Islamic people.’32 Zia, Shahi, and the Pakistani media were unwilling 
to recognise that the ‘Islamic bomb’ was born from their rhetoric. 
 
Throughout the summer and autumn of 1979, the press continued to posit a pan-Islamic 
nuclear project centred on Pakistan. American journalist Don Oberdorfer buried 
administration statements on the lack of evidence for an ‘Islamic bomb’ at the foot of an 																																																								
28 William D. Edwards, ‘MCPL Nuclear Alert Series, IV,’ 12 July 1979, C[ongressional] R[ecord], 96th Session, 
18414-18415; Fortney H. Stark, ‘MCPL Nuclear Alert Series V,’ 6 September 1979, CR96, 23432-23433; Fortney H. 
Stark, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Program,’ 23 October 1979, CR96, 29252-29253 
29 Lester L. Wolff, ‘Resolution of Inquiry into the Matter of Billy Carter,’ 10 September 1980, CR96, 24958. 
30 Michael Charlton, Interview with Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, Transcript, 21 June 1979, TNA FCO96/955, 1. 
31 U[nited] K[ingdom] E[mbassy] Islamabad to FCO, ‘Pakistan Nuclear,’ 2 July 1979, TNA FCO96/956, 1. 
32 UKE Islamabad to FCO, ‘Pakistan Nuclear: Agha Shahi’s Press Briefing,’ 2 July 1979, TNA FCO96/956, 2-3. 
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article on Congressional disquiet.33 Sunanda Datta-Ray, reporting from Calcutta for the 
Guardian, referenced the ‘intense speculation about the imminence of the Libyan 
financed “Islamic bomb”.’34 A subsequent article on British links to the clandestine 
Pakistani purchasing programme ignored official comment about the meme’s 
speculative nature and once more suggested Libyan financing for the project.35 In India, 
D.K. Palit and P.K.S. Namboodiri published Pakistan’s Islamic Bomb, arguing Pakistan 
was engaging in a pan-Islamic nuclear project.36 The book contributed nothing new to 
the debate, offering no proof of ‘Arab’ funding for Pakistan’s programme and leaving 
the project’s Islamic nature implicit.37 
On 9 December, Observer journalists Colin Smith and Shyam Bhatia contended 
that ‘Dr Khan Stole the Bomb For Islam’, following up on mid-year stories alleging 
British links to the Pakistani nuclear programme.38 Smith and Bhatia amplified this a 
week later with another article considering the wider implications of pan-Islamic 
nuclear proliferation.39 These articles inspired Tam Dalyell to raise the matter in 
parliament, delivering a philippic against the Pakistani nuclear programme and the 
prospect of atomic proliferation in the Islamic world.40 After pointing towards a 
‘potential world holocaust’ originating in the Arab world or Asia, he argued that: 
 
‘This is a spine-chilling prospect – a dream of nightmare proportions … an 
Islamic bomb is more spine-chilling than the whole nuclear armament in the 
hands of the men in the Kremlin and in Washington. Great governments, such as 																																																								
33 ‘Arms sales to Pakistan Urged to Stave Off A-Bomb There,’ WP, 6 April 1979, A7. 
34 ‘Pie in the nuclear sky may save Charan Singh,’ TG, 19 August 1979, 7. 
35 ‘Pakistan bomb link denied,’ TG, 23 August 1979, 3. 
36 D K Palit and P K S Namboodiri, Pakistan’s Islamic Bomb (New Delhi, 1979). 
37 UKE Islamabad to FCO, ‘Pakistan’s Islamic Bomb: An Indian Survey,’ 1 August 1979, TNA FCO37/2206. 
38 ‘How Dr Khan Stole the Bomb for Islam,’ The Observer (hereafter TO), 9 December 1979, 11. 
39 ‘Atoms for War,’ TO, 16 December 1979, 12. 
40 ‘MPs to debate atom bomb revelations,’ TO, 16 December 1979, 1; ‘MP Praises Observer,’ TO, 23 December 
1979, 14. 
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those of the Soviet Union or the United States, can be counted upon to act with 
deliberation … but the bad dream come true of a Gadaffi [sic] bomb or an 
ayatollah bomb is altogether different.41 
 
Dalyell’s apocalyptically orientalist speech symbolised how embedded the ‘Islamic 
bomb’ had become in discussions about the intersections between nuclear technology 
and the Islamic world. He personified the parliamentary pressure on the government, his 
barrage of questions covering the Khan Affair, covert purchasing, and the ‘Islamic 
bomb’. 42 On 17 January 1980, Thatcher responded to Dalyell’s probing, assuring him 
of government action to prevent the Khan affair’s repetition.43 Shortly thereafter, 
Dalyell reiterated his ‘nightmare’ of an ‘Islamic bomb’, asserting that nations and not 
individuals were at fault: 
 
If I have nightmares, they are about a Pakistani bomb or a Libyan bomb. We are 
now told that the Iraqis are doing [sic] nuclear weapons for some years, should 
also be about an Iraqi bomb [sic]. Those nations might use a nuclear bomb. It is 
for that reason that I go on and on, at Prime Minister's Question Time, about the 
Khan incident, the Urenco incident at Almelo.44 
 
																																																								
41 Tam Dalyell, House of Commons Debate, 18 December 1979, Hansard Online, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1979/dec/18/joint-centrifuge-project-almelo#column_555 (accessed 
May10, 2013). 
42 The Liberal Lord Avebury, the Labour Lord Wynne-Jones, and the usual ‘awkward squad’ of anti-nuclear MPs 
such as Frank Allaun also asked questions. 
43 Tam Dalyell, ‘Nuclear Security,’ 17 January 1980, Hansard Online, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/written_answers/1980/jan/17/nuclear-
security#S5CV0976P2_19800117_CWA_24 (accessed 30 October 2013). 
44 Tam Dalyell, ‘Nuclear Weapons,’ 22 January 1980, Hansard Online, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1980/jan/24/nuclear-weapons#column_726 (accessed 30 October 
1980). 
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Dalyell put over forty questions to the government during January and February, 
continually alluding to the ‘development of a Pakistani or Islamic nuclear weapon.’45 
His question on ‘Arab links with Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme’ received a 
response from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) that such associations 
were speculative, rendering official comment impossible. The FCO underscored such 
rumours’ persistence – especially in connection with Libya – while stressing the lack of 
conclusive evidence for such links.46 
 
Throughout 1980, the media continually imbued the Pakistani nuclear programme with 
transnational religious overtones. Just as in 1979 when the issue came to prominence, 
the media used the ‘Islamic bomb’ – often in a lazy or sensationalist manner – as 
shorthand for an expected proliferation cascade with dire consequences for the Middle 
East. 
Since late 1979, stories had circulated about transfers of uranium ore from the 
Islamic African nation of Niger to Libya and Pakistan.47 Rumours of violent uranium 
convoy hijackings and diversion to Libya and Pakistan precipitated hurried denials from 
Nigerien-French mining concerns SOMAIR and COMINAK.48 Reporting on the matter 
again argued for a Libyan-funded, Pakistani-designed ‘Islamic bomb’.49 
The media continually framed stories about Pakistani nuclear aspirations within 
a pan-Islamic context. Discussion of Libya seemed to require a mention of alleged 
Libyan-Pakistani cooperation, regardless of whether or not Libya could be considered 
																																																								
45 ‘Pakistanis rejected aid to protect nuclear programme,’ TT, 8 March 1980, 5; Tam Dalyell, ‘Nuclear Security,’ 31 
January 1980, Hansard Online, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1980/jan/31/nuclear-security-
1#S5CV0977P0_19800131_HOC_285 (accessed 30 October 2013). 
46 ‘Draft Supplementary PQ (Mr Dalyell),’ 25 January 1980, TNA FCO96/1103. 
47 ‘French Uranium for Libya,’ The Sunday Times, 2 December 1979, E28. 
48 ‘Translation of a Telex from Head of Public Relations of CEA to Mr Chadwick,’ 4 January 1980, TNA 
FCO96/1103. 
49 ‘French deny direct sale of uranium to Pakistan,’ TG, 5 January 1980, 5. 
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an ‘Islamic’ nation.50 Journalists couched their commentary in the now familiar 
language of and Muslim proliferation cascade, merging Pakistanis, Arabs, ‘fanaticism’, 
and Islam into an undifferentiated mass. Syndicated political columnist Jack Anderson 
wrote: 
 
When Pakistan does get its nuclear bomb, the world will enter a new and more 
dangerous era. A shaky dictatorship like Gen. Zia ul-Haq’s, armed with a 
nuclear arsenal is frightening enough. What makes the situation far worse is that 
Pakistan will likely share its nuclear know-how with even less responsible Arab 
nations, like the fanatic Muammar Qaddafi’s Libya, which is a protector of 
terrorists and an implacable foe of Israel.51 
 
Echoing Dalyell’s December 1979 address, Anderson’s piece illustrates how entrenched 
the belief that Pakistan would share its nuclear technology with its co-religionists had 
become. As Rodney Jones argues, ‘Islamic bomb’ coverage implicitly (and sometimes 
explicitly) suggested ‘worst-case scenarios about threats to the security and perhaps 
survival of Israel.’52 
 On 16 June, the BBC aired ‘Project 706: The Islamic Bomb’, underscoring 
alleged Pakistani-Libyan connections, uranium from Niger, the complicity of British, 
German, Italian, and Swiss industry, and the threat of Islamic proliferation. Reporter 
Philip Tibenham opened by alarmingly informing viewers that: 
 
																																																								
50 ‘President’s positions fall to rebel forces in Chad,’ TG, 5 April 1980, 5. 
51 ‘Pakistan Near Entry Into Atomic Club,’ WP, 11 April 1980, B9. 
52 Rodney W. Jones, 44. 
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This convoy grinding across the empty Sahara is carrying what could be the raw 
material for the world’s first nuclear war …. It’s been mined in the Islamic state 
of Niger. It’ll be flown on to Islamic Libya; then on to Islamic Pakistan. Tonight, 
Panorama reports exclusively on payments of millions of pounds by Libya’s 
Colonel Gaddafi to finance Pakistan’s efforts to build the ‘Islamic bomb’.53 
 
The FCO’s Joint Nuclear Unit (JNU) assessed the documentary as correct in general 
terms, but speculative and inaccurate in detail. Analysts contended that by far the most 
important allegation was the Libyan/‘Islamic’ bomb, but that there was still no 
substantive evidence that Libya had provided finance or that Pakistan had agreed to 
proliferate. Anonymous allegations in the documentary were ‘sensational’ but carried 
‘little conviction’.54 For Thatcher’s government, the most embarrassing element was the 
programme’s transmission during a visit to London by Agha Shahi, provoking anger 
amongst the Pakistani delegation.55 Crucially, British experts did not see the film as 
harmful to the government or detrimental to international anti-proliferation efforts.56 In 
the face of media reporting on the documentary – particularly in the Guardian – the 
Thatcher government stressed Pakistani assurances and the lack of evidence for an 
Islamic connection.57 
 As the media continued to draw attention to the Pakistani nuclear programme’s 
supposed religious aspects, journalists drew other states into the fold. The Daily Express 
cited Ba’athist Iraq as the next nation likely to ‘go nuclear’ in a lurid story about 
murders, smugglers, and Parisian chambermaids, warning its readers that, ‘Arab states 																																																								
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have lost all hope of winning a conventional war against Israel. So a terrifying premium 
has been placed on the alternative – a nuclear bomb. Pakistan, funded by Libya’s 
Colonel Gaddafi, already has the know-how.’58 The Guardian’s Eric Silver, reporting 
from Jerusalem, observed, ‘no one here doubts the danger from an Arab or Islamic 
bomb.’59 In an editorial also criticising Israel’s nuclear stance, the normally sober Times 
asked if ‘fanatical Islamic revolutionaries?’ might possess nuclear weapons or could the 
Libyan-Pakistani ‘Islamic bomb’ have eventuated by 1985?60 The latter question did not 
go unchallenged. Syed Aziz Pasha, General Secretary of the Union of Muslim 
Organisations of UK and Eire, castigated The Times for causing ‘anger and distress’ to 
all Muslims. Aziz contended that the ‘Islamic bomb’ did not exist, arguing that no other 
nuclear programme had ever been named for the originating state’s religious affiliations. 
The newspaper rather primly responded, ‘The phrase “Islamic bomb”, which has passed 
into common usage, did not originate with the The Times.’61 
The protest by Aziz did not prevent the The Times publishing another piece on 
Pakistan explicitly connecting nuclear ambitions and Islam. Going back to Bhutto’s 
claims and couched in classically orientalist tropes of irrational ‘Islamic’ violence, the 
article concluded ‘Pakistan’s nuclear activity – and the implications of an Islamic bomb, 
if ever such a thing should exist – threaten to usher in a new age of uncertainty.’62 
Veteran journalist James Cameron, even while satirising attitudes towards nuclear 
weapons, asserted that Islam was ‘the originator of spreading God’s word by the sword’ 
and that he would not ‘especially like to be sent into eternity by a General Zia finger on 
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the button, let alone a Khomeini finger.’63 Even in satire, Islam was portrayed as violent 
and the ‘Islamic bomb’ as leading to an almost inevitable Middle Eastern apocalypse.  
 The American press also weighed in, mixing the Khan Affair, Islam, and 
Tripoli’s anti-Americanism. Revelations surrounding Billy Carter’s Libyan business 
connections – then under investigation by the Justice Department – did not help.64 In a 
Washington Post article that liberally referenced the Panorama documentary, an 
anonymous US official made a thinly veiled swipe at the Europeans, commenting, 
‘Some countries were lax and bureaucratically inept … but some others knew what was 
happening and allowed it to go ahead for political or commercial reasons.’65 By the 
year’s end, the same newspaper reported alleged fissures in the ‘Islamic bomb’ project, 
Libya portrayed as frustrated by a lack of Pakistani progress.66  
 
In the media, the idea that a Pakistani nuclear bomb was axiomatically an Islamic bomb 
had – by 1980 – become so firmly embedded that it went almost totally unchallenged. 
The ‘Libyan connection’, Bhutto and Zia’s inflammatory rhetoric, and the perceived 
certainty of pan-Islamic proliferation were accepted as fact, rebuttals and repudiations 
going unheeded. Media comment on the ‘Islamic bomb’ tended towards the orientalist, 
alarmist, and unthinkingly ritualised. As the issue developed, Edward Said published 
the landmark Orientalism. Although scholars have debated Said’s thesis ever since, his 
thoughts on media images of Islam are apposite in this instance.67 ‘Lurking behind all 
these images,’ he argues, ‘is the menace of jihad. Consequence: a fear that Muslims (or 
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Arabs) will take over the world.’68 Fear did lie behind public discussion of the Islamic 
bomb: fear of Middle Eastern nuclear war and more modest – but still significant – fears 
of changes in the balance of power between the Muslim world and the West.  As 
sociologist Jonathan Lyons notes, there is a ‘single, persistent Western discursive 
formation of violence in Islam that remains largely immune to serious challenge on 
historical, linguistic, and theological bases.’69 Moreover, non-proliferation and the 
‘Islamic bomb’ fed into the belief that developed nations had a monopoly over the 
legitimate use and technologies of violence.70 Cultural anthropologist Hugh Gusterson 
comments that for decades, creators of foreign policy and public opinion saw the spread 
of nuclear weapons to the Islamic world as particularly dangerous.71 In the case of 
Pakistan in the 1970s, both Gusterson and Lyons correctly assess public discourses, but 
as the documentary evidence will demonstrate, policymakers were far less influenced 
by fear of pan-Islamic proliferation. 
 
Government Reactions 
While the ‘Islamic bomb’ became embedded in the media coverage of Pakistan, nuclear 
weapons, and the Middle East, policymakers in Washington and London sought to cut 
through the speculation, despite the increased pressure that these issues put on non-
proliferation policy. Those making non-proliferation policy placed little credence in the 
blustery rhetoric emanating from Islamabad.  
 Western foreign ministers discussed Zia’s 1978 comments at July’s G7 summit 
in Bonn, French foreign minister Louis de Guiringaud contending that such ‘disquieting’ 
statements ‘exposed the Pakistani position to the public,’ and made it easier for France 																																																								
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to justify delaying or cancelling the reprocessing plant. However, the US secretary of 
state Cyrus Vance saw Zia’s pronouncements as a bluff and was quick to point out that 
the quite different Islamic states of Saudi Arabia and Iran had urged Pakistan not to 
build a nuclear weapon.72 
Vance’s deputy, Warren Christopher – as part of the diplomatic campaign 
against the Franco-Pakistani reprocessing plant deal – alluded to Bhutto’s jail cell 
pronouncements. ‘We do not necessarily accept Mr. Bhutto’s claims of imminent 
success in this [nuclear] field,’ stated Christopher, ‘but we do find this statement of 
intentions to be disquieting.’73 Even though Christopher found Bhutto’s remarks 
‘disquieting’ and potentially having ‘profound implications,’ the implied Islamic 
dimension did not change basic assumptions about the Pakistani programme. 
Christopher and his colleagues ‘were under no illusion that Pakistan’s motivations or 
intentions have changed,’ with Islamabad’s nuclear ambitions still perceived as a 
‘national project.’74 Thus, Bhutto and Zia’s rhetoric failed to alter perceptions and 
policy regarding their intentions. For the Carter administration, while the ‘Islamic bomb’ 
idea might have proved ‘disquieting,’ it did not change the fundamental assumptions 
about the national quality of Pakistan’s bomb project and the dual issues of regional 
stability and global non-proliferation policy.  
Between the Iranian Revolution and the ‘Islamic bomb’ becoming a public issue, 
the idea preyed upon American and British officials. Visiting London, Jack Miklos 
(deputy assistant secretary of state for the Near East & South Asia) and Paul Kreisberg 
(of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs) suggested that Pakistan had ‘offered to be 
the supplier of nuclear weapons to the Arab world.’ For them, this explained perceived 																																																								
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Pakistani casualness about the risks of American economic sanctions.75 US ambassador 
to Pakistan Arthur Hummel echoed these beliefs, suggesting that Zia might use future 
nuclear capability to win financial support from ‘Arab oil producers.’76 Missives from 
the British Embassy in Islamabad mirrored this worry, arguing an American embargo’s 
impact on the Pakistani economy might be minimal ‘if accounts of Arab backing for 
Pakistan’s nuclear programme are correct.’ In such a case, the Symington Amendment’s 
invocation – a US law banning economic and military assistance to nations illegally 
engaging in uranium enrichment – would move Pakistan closer to the Islamic world, 
rather than achieving non-proliferation aims.77 Although Pakistani moves towards 
closer alliances with the Islamic world were not signifiers of a desire to spread the 
‘Islamic bomb,’ this created a paradoxical point in policymakers’ minds: by taking 
action to head off the ‘Islamic bomb,’ the US might increase the chances of alienating 
Pakistan. 
 For some American and British policymakers, public speculation provoked 
anxiety about the propaganda implications. Not only would a break in relations with 
moderate Muslim state like Pakistan adversely affect the similarly restrained Gulf states’ 
sentiments, there was apprehension about the ‘Islamic bomb’s’ impact on Israeli and 
Indian attitudes towards Pakistan. Cyrus Vance – in agreement with his British 
counterparts – fretted not about the reality of an ‘Islamic bomb’, but the effects of the 
looming public outcry on India and the Middle East. 78 
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India remained a major concern, as New Delhi vacillated over whether or not 
Pakistan was pursuing an ‘Islamic bomb.’79 The Indians frequently made much of the 
issue, unsurprisingly given the long history of Indo-Pakistani conflict. Britain’s high 
commissioner to India, Sir John Thomson, offered a more nuanced response, suggesting 
that there might only be general, ephemeral support for the Pakistani nuclear 
programme amongst Muslim countries.80 At the highest level, British prime minister 
Jim Callaghan agreed with his Indian counterpart Morarji Desai that if there were 
evidence of Arab involvement in Pakistan’s project, this would make the situation much 
more serious, but Callaghan could offer no evidence of Muslim funding.81 At this stage, 
American and British policymakers and diplomats recognised that the ‘Islamic bomb’ 
idea was a provocation, not a reality, prompting Israeli fears of a nuclear threat from the 
Islamic world, increasing long-standing Indo-Pakistani tension, and potentially pushing 
India towards full nuclear weaponisation. 
Alarmists in Washington and London argued that the ‘Islamic bomb’ 
represented a genuine threat. Hummel – having previously claimed that Zia’s comments 
were a ‘gaffe’ – now contended that sharing nuclear technology was the quid pro quo 
for Islamic support of Pakistan’s programme, suspecting that supporters included Libya 
and Saudi Arabia.82 Meeting with senior State Department officials in Washington, 
Anthony Parsons (temporarily deputy under-secretary at the FCO) observed that ‘events 
in Pakistan were one of the most horrifying developments since 1945’.83 Parsons had 
never been shy about making fearful pronouncements regarding Islamic nuclear 																																																								
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capability. ‘Pakistan is paranoid in its attitude towards India,’ he wrote, ‘and I do not at 
all like the association between the Pakistani nuclear programme and Arab money (not 
proven but likely) in the present atmosphere prevailing in the Moslem world. It would 
not be difficult to construct a Nevil Shute type scenario out of all of this.’84 
Parsons’ view – influenced by the recent Iranian Revolution – exposed an 
underlying fear of a violent, irrational Muslim world dragging the planet to a nuclear 
fate of the kind so vividly depicted in Shute’s 1957 novel On The Beach. Shute’s 
representation of atomic apocalypse had galvanised readers and reviewers alike and in 
the intervening years it had become the iconic image illustrating nuclear Armageddon.85 
Parsons’ comments are illustrative of ‘Islamic bomb’ fears in government. However, his 
argument’s main thrust was that Pakistan was an unstable, paranoid state with a deeply 
unsatisfactory government.86 Parsons’ statements, whilst expressing fear of Muslim 
nuclear weapons, were more deeply founded in classically Western concerns about 
‘irrational’ and ‘unstable’ oriental peoples and rulers. The concerns expressed by 
Parsons did, however, have a genuine basis. Pakistan did have an extremely troubled 
and volatile political history, with extended periods of military rule and martial law. 
In the face of alarmists such as Hummel and Parsons, the influential British 
GEN 167 Official Group on Nuclear Proliferation thought it unlikely that Arab 
countries would knowingly fund the Pakistani nuclear programme, even though many 
Muslim states might be glad that a co-religionist had achieved the ‘ultimate 
technological feat’.87 For countries like Saudi Arabia, relations with the West were seen 
as far more important than connections with Islamabad, despite the significance of 																																																								
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Pakistan as a bulwark between the Muslim world and the USSR. The group suggested 
enlisting Arab governments in order to put pan-Islamic pressure on Pakistan, arguing 
that security concerns related to India – and not a desire to equip the Muslim world with 
a ‘nuclear sword’ – were the main drivers behind the nuclear programme. Consequently, 
addressing Islamabad’s security issues – a constant in British and American discussions 
about Pakistan – represented the surest way of achieving positive results.88 Where the 
pan-Islamic issue might come into play – GEN 167 suggested – was after a Pakistani 
nuclear test, where Islamabad might enlist Muslim countries to help resist Western 
pressure to give up ‘the first nuclear weapon to be developed in a Moslem country.’89 
 Despite the apocalyptic visions of some individuals, in 1978 and early 1979 
policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic saw the ‘Islamic bomb’ meme as provocative, 
rather than a genuine threat. The most worrying aspects were the potential reactions of 
Israel and India, two states with ambiguous nuclear capabilities who felt most 
threatened by, respectively, the Islamic world and Pakistan specifically. The consensus 
was that although it was a worrying idea, there was no hard evidence for an ‘Islamic 
bomb’. 
 
As the ‘Islamic bomb’ was on the cusp of becoming a major public issue, the Carter 
administration faced a wave of intelligence and publicity that made the Symington 
Amendment’s imposition a virtual certainty. January to March saw numerous efforts 
aimed at retarding the imposition by engaging with Zia’s government. The State 
Department saw the problem as one of regional security and stability: with the situation 
in Iran, a rupture with Pakistan could pose serious regional problems for the US.90 The 																																																								
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elite, multi-agency Policy Review Committee (PRC) agreed to delay the Symington 
Amendment’s imposition on the grounds of on-going diplomatic efforts and Pakistan’s 
critical regional importance.91 Hummel had confronted Zia with intelligence about the 
nuclear programme and the Pakistani president responded angrily, offering inspection 
rights to Pakistan’s nuclear facilities as proof of his peaceful intentions.92 The 
administration seized this opportunity, as it usefully demonstrated to Congress the 
correctness of resisting the Symington Amendment’s application.93 In the end, Zia 
dashed hopes for inspections when – unmoved by warnings about US legislation – he 
informed Warren Christopher that he would not permit scrutiny of nuclear facilities and 
refused to rule out a ‘peaceful’ nuclear test.94 
The growing publicity attendant upon Pakistani ambitions highlighted the 
problematic nature of open US challenges to Zia’s government. In contrast to the ‘softly 
softly’ approach favoured by some State Department officials, Carter’s roving non-
proliferation ambassador Gerard Smith echoed Anthony Parsons’ view that the situation 
posed the ‘sharpest challenge to the international structure since 1945.’ Smith argued 
that when faced with an eroding global consensus against nuclear weapons, ‘[T]he 
prospect of ‘Moslem’ bombs is as likely as a German and Japanese bomb (consider 
what their jingos would make of these countries remaining 3d class powers.)’ 95 The 
threat in Smith’s eyes was not the ‘Islamic bomb’, but the impact of Pakistani nuclear 
attainment on the international scene, leading to a cascade of key non-nuclear states 
deciding to pursue the nuclear option. Smith argued that the current non-proliferation 
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policy towards the subcontinent was too parochial and demanded that the situation be 
placed in a global context.96 Realising that publicity about the Pakistani programme was 
inevitable, State Department non-proliferationists such as Tom Pickering favoured a 
‘sunshine approach,’ placing the full glare of publicity on Pakistan, potentially turning 
international opinion against Islamabad.97  
 Zia’s intransigence, the Symington Amendment’s looming implementation, and 
the flow of information on the purchasing project led the State Department to scramble 
for a new policy. Hummel argued only a ‘bold initiative’ would meet Pakistani security 
requirements and constrain nuclear ambitions.98 Pickering and Harold Saunders 
(assistant secretary of state for Near East Affairs) suggested such a ‘bold initiative’, an 
‘audacious buy-off’ comprised of extensive security assistance – consisting of arms 
sales and economic aid – aimed at assuaging Pakistani fears.99 Pickering and Saunders 
also noted that, ‘The likelihood of an ‘Islamic bomb’ with its consequences in the Arab-
Israeli dispute will increase Congressional concerns over anything we might propose 
doing for Pakistan.’100 Here, Pickering and Saunders worried that the ‘Islamic bomb’ 
meme would cause increased consternation in an actively non-proliferationist Congress. 
However, the proposal never gained traction. Warren Christopher’s assistant Steve 
Oxman thought Pickering and Saunders were ‘dreaming’ if they imagined the package 
would look like anything other than a bribe for Pakistan and if they believed Congress 
would permit such a package in the face of persuasive evidence of Pakistani nuclear 
ambitions.101 Despite their conflicting conclusions, all those concerned recognised that 
Congress might pursue an even tougher line against Islamabad because of the media 																																																								
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prominence of the ‘Islamic bomb’ and the genuine evidence of Pakistan’s nationalist 
nuclear ambitions. 
By early April, events were taking place that typified the tension between the 
various strands of Carter’s foreign policy and regional and global proliferation concerns. 
As Smith had noted in March, the administration needed to think about how Pakistan 
was affecting the global environment.102 Pakistani security was certainly a regional 
issue and non-proliferation was a global issue. Addressing one meant addressing the 
other, and vice versa. On April 6, 1979 – two days after Bhutto’s execution – Carter 
invoked the Symington Amendment, embargoing military and economic aid to Pakistan 
because of mounting evidence of a uranium enrichment project. The aid cut-off, 
coupled with the Khan Affair’s exposure, created more headlines and antagonised a 
Pakistani political establishment dealing with the violent domestic convulsions 
provoked by Bhutto’s execution.103 Islamabad was particularly aggrieved that the US 
had continued to supply nuclear fuel to the Indian reactor at Tarapur, an issue that was 
causing difficulties for the Indo-American relationship.104 There was scant enthusiasm 
in the Carter administration for the imposition of sanctions, as Pakistan would suffer 
little real harm from the withdrawal of bilateral economic aid. However, failure to 
publicly react to the blatant Pakistani activities would signal acquiescence to 
Islamabad’s nuclear ambitions and diminish US credibility on non-proliferation 
issues.105 
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At the same time as the Carter administration was grappling with the issue of non-
proliferation credibility, the media extensively publicised the Khan Affair.106 The story 
eventually broke wide open as other news outlets followed ZDF’s lead.107 The FCO 
expected an onslaught against Britain, and readied briefings defending British 
actions.108 During May 1979’s hard-fought British general election campaign, the FCO 
attempted to deflect questions towards The Hague and aligned Britain with American 
concerns about the enrichment programme.110 In the wake of April 6 and the Islamic 
element’s widening media prominence, London and Washington placed little credence 
in the idea of a pan-Islamic nuclear capability originating in Pakistan. Despite 
provocative Indian speculation that Pakistan’s sole nuclear desire was to produce an 
‘Islamic bomb’ funded by Arab money, key FCO officials were unanimous in doubting 
the real or potential existence of an ‘Arab bomb.’111 The JNU’s David Carter described 
evidence for this as ‘woefully thin.’112  
Meanwhile, Islamabad responded to the Symington Amendment’s imposition by 
making the embargo a pan-Islamic issue. Agha Shahi argued that it was ‘discriminatory, 
based on false charges, and designed to keep nuclear power out of the hands of Muslim 
countries.’113 Shahi contended that the restriction was the fault of a ‘Zionist lobby’ and 
denied that Libya or any Muslim country was funding the nuclear programme.114 
During this tense period, State Department guidance for US consular officials 
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emphasised the problem of regional and global proliferation and not religious 
affiliation: 
 
Q: What would be the implications for the Middle East of what has been 
described as a “Muslim bomb” to balance the Israeli bomb? 
 
A: As you know the Israelis have repeatedly stated in the past that they would 
not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the region. In our view, any 
proliferation of nuclear weapons anywhere can only have the most serious 
consequences for world security.115 
 
US discussion guidelines for consular officials illustrated that policymakers – despite 
what individuals might think in private – realised the ‘Islamic bomb’ was a propaganda 
problem by stressing that the issue was not one of discrimination, emphasising 
extensive US nuclear cooperation with Muslim countries like Indonesia, Turkey, and 
pre-revolutionary Iran.116 
Over time, it became apparent that the evidence for an ‘Islamic bomb’ was 
limited at best, non-existent at worst. In bilateral US-UK discussions, Pickering 
highlighted fragmentary Australian indications about Libya and Iraq.117 However, he 
observed that while Saudi Arabia was a substantial aid donor to Pakistan, it was 
doubtful the Saudis explicitly intended to finance the nuclear programme, especially as 
Riyadh was making disapproving noises about Pakistani atomic intentions.118 John 
Bushell, in his valedictory dispatch as British ambassador in Islamabad, echoed doubts 																																																								
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about the willingness of Muslim states to align themselves with Pakistan’s nuclear 
project and a concurrent Pakistani unwillingness to ally with Iranian-style political 
Islam. Bushell argued that ‘cooperation with Muslim brothers, yes, alliance on the basis 
of fundamentalist Islam, no thank you.’119 The ambassador contended that Pakistan was 
indeed a significant Muslim nation in terms of its population, but other Islamic states 
might treat the thought of Pakistan as an ‘arsenal of Islam’ with caution.120 Furthermore, 
Bushell asked, ‘In Islamic terms an ‘arsenal’ Pakistan may be: but now an arsenal in 
nuclear terms also? With the problems of its politics and policies post-Bhutto, which 
Arabs can seriously want to become engaged with Pakistan?’121 Following up, the 
outgoing ambassador argued that the further Pakistan went with a nuclear programme, 
Zia would find it harder to give it up, particularly if it became an asset in Pakistani 
relations with the wider Muslim world.122 
 
By late spring, the US government was making efforts to persuade interested parties 
that the ‘Islamic bomb’ was little more than propaganda. The Americans voiced fears of 
a nuclear arms race on the sub-continent and tried to demolish New Delhi’s belief that 
the real danger posed by Pakistan lay in an Israeli/Islamic nuclear confrontation.123 In 
Washington, Pickering faced questioning in Congress. He noted that the administration 
believed Pakistan was aiming for nuclear weapons capability but refused to openly 
discuss alleged Libyan financing, leading to further media comment.124 
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In meetings between Vance, Smith, and Agha Shahi, Shahi stressed that the 
‘Islamic bomb’ was pure speculation, highlighting that Pakistan had turned down Saudi 
offers to finance the reprocessing plant. Castigating the ‘Islamic bomb’ as nonsensical 
was a theme in Shahi’s representations throughout 1979.125 US officials felt that 
Pakistan was working hard to get the right reaction from the Muslim and developing 
worlds, in case they had to publicly justify the nuclear programme’s military nature.126  
From using the ‘Islamic bomb’ as a threat, the Pakistanis began belittling the very idea 
they had helped create. Vance’s subordinate, deputy assistant secretary for Near Eastern 
and South Asian Affairs Peter Constable, writing on 6 June, argued that the US could 
address potential Pakistani nuclear sharing by distributing nuclear technology amongst 
Pakistan’s ‘Islamic friends’. Coupled with renewed US-Pakistani ties, this offered the 
US ‘a much better chance of exerting influence against any GOP [Government of 
Pakistan] move to contribute to a so-called Islamic bomb.’127 Thus, Constable 
advocated undercutting Pakistan by offering Muslim states the fruits of nuclear 
technology without the threat of nuclear weapons. Yet, there was still no hard evidence 
for the ‘Islamic bomb’. Intelligence sources acknowledged that the issue was the subject 
of feverish speculation and believed that Pakistan might have a material interest in 
spreading nuclear technology, but analysts had no substantive evidence for pan-Islamic 
nuclear cooperation.128 
However, the CIA suggested that offers of political and financial support from 
oil-rich sympathisers in the Islamic world might tempt Pakistan. Indeed, Saudi Arabia, 
Libya, or Iraq might have induced Pakistan to share sensitive nuclear equipment and to 																																																								
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propose terms for future nuclear cooperation.129 The CIA later reversed its position on 
the Iraqi example, casting doubt on Pakistani willingness to provide nuclear technology 
or materials to Baghdad because of Islamic solidarity.130 In an assessment of Pakistani 
connections in the Middle East, the agency again suggested that Libya and Pakistan 
were cooperating on nuclear weapons, later contending that Pakistani attainment of ‘the 
bomb’ might axiomatically imply Libyan nuclear capability.131 The CIA’s position is at 
least partially explicable by reference to the agency’s position at the end of the 1970s. 
Carter was circumscribing the CIA’s powers, and the foregrounding of new ‘threats to 
national security’ would serve as a countermeasure to this. In the case of Iran, the 
general feeling within government was that the intelligence agency had failed to 
anticipate the clerics rise and triumph. Thus, a fixation on the Muslim threat may have 
been overcompensation for this oversight.132 
As media speculation mounted, further pressure came from the nation most 
fearful of Islamic nuclear capability. Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin contacted 
British, French, and West German leaders warning of the dangers posed by the ‘Islamic 
bomb’ and demanding action. Writing to Thatcher, Begin described in dire terms the 
consequences of a Pakistani nuclear weapon in the hands of Gaddafi.133 The attached 
Israeli briefing linked Pakistan and the Arab world, but none of the Israeli intelligence 
was new and nothing confirmed the existence of pan-Islamic nuclear cooperation.134 
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The FCO’s Paul Lever – an experienced senior civil servant – did not subscribe 
to Begin’s assertions, stating: 
 
While we share their concern, we believe that they may be making over much of 
Pakistani-Arab links. Although the Pakistanis are getting financial aid from 
Arab states the limited evidence available to us (and the Americans) does not 
support the suggestion that there is any plan to produce an “Islamic Bomb” or to 
produce weapons-usable material in Pakistan for other Islamic countries.135 
 
The speaking note prepared for Thatcher’s May 23 meeting with Begin reflected this 
viewpoint, shared throughout the FCO and other departments.136 Despite the media 
exposure, JNU chief Robert Alston emphasised the continuing validity of earlier British 
Joint Intelligence Committee reporting that there was little evidence of Arab assistance 
for Pakistan’s nuclear activities.137 In the face of widening media coverage, the FCO 
advised British consular officials worldwide that there was ‘virtually no evidence’ for 
‘Arab financing’ of Pakistan’s nuclear programme.138 
Thatcher responded via a personal letter to the Israeli leader.139 Thatcher 
sympathised with Israel’s position, but repeated the FCO’s analysis that, ‘None of the 
evidence currently available to us suggests there is any arrangement to transfer 
weapons-useable material from Pakistan to other Islamic states or organisations.’140 She 
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went on to outline the many steps Britain had taken to thwart clandestine Pakistani 
purchasing and urged Begin to consider his own country’s role in preventing Middle 
Eastern nuclear proliferation.141 A month later, British foreign secretary Lord Peter 
Carrington probed Indian foreign minister Shyam Nandan Mishra at the Commonwealth 
Heads of Government meeting in Lusaka, Zambia. Carrington asked if the Pakistanis 
were developing an ‘Islamic bomb’ or a ‘Pakistani bomb’. Mishra’s aide, Jagat Mehta, 
could not discern an ‘integrated Islamic political strategy’ behind the programme. 
Carrington replied that if it did prove to be an Islamic bomb, ‘it would make the Middle 
East even more unstable.’142 The Thatcher-Begin letters and the related FCO 
discussions illustrate the way in which fears created by the  ‘Islamic bomb’ meme 
needed addressing. Despite the media coverage there was still little intelligence pointing 
to a pan-Islamic nuclear project. 
 As media attention to Pakistan’s ‘Islamic bomb’ increased, public speculation 
began to affect relations between both the US and Pakistan and the UK and Pakistan. 
Robin Fearn – the British embassy in Islamabad’s head of chancery –described the 
Pakistanis as being in a state of ‘mounting exasperation’ over the never-ending 
revelations about their clandestine activities.143 Most damaging for trilateral relations 
was American journalist Richard Burt’s mid-August feature on Pakistan in the New 
York Times. As one of three potential solutions to the Pakistani problem, Burt suggested 
that the US was planning military strikes against nuclear installations.144 Pakistani 
foreign secretary Sardar Shah Nawaz protested vigorously to Hummel, claiming that the 
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article had been ‘inspired’ by the US government.145 In the midst of this, Shah Nawaz 
submitted a letter Zia had composed before the Burt article. According to Zia, Congress 
had misunderstood the Pakistani nuclear programme which, making matters worse, was 
described as a ‘Muslim atom bomb.’ Zia offered Carter a ‘firm assurance that Pakistan’s 
nuclear programme is entirely peaceful in nature and that Pakistan has no intention of 
acquiring or manufacturing nuclear weapons.’146 This assurance – something that US 
officials had sought for months – was not as unequivocal as the administration desired 
and fell short of explicitly ruling out nuclear testing or the transfer of materials to other 
states, but that did not stop Zia repeating similar formulations for the rest of the year.147 
The Burt article elicited hasty US government repudiations, and concurrent 
Pakistani moves to increase defences around the ‘peaceful’ enrichment facilities at 
Kahuta.148 Here was a key instance of the media coverage surrounding Pakistan’s 
nuclear aspirations and the notion of an ‘Islamic bomb’ having a demonstrable and 
damaging effect on the chances for a diplomatic solution by further alienating Pakistan. 
State Department spokespeople hurried to deny that the US was planning to strike at its 
South Asian ally while the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Hummel 
for a dressing-down.149 In conversation with British consular officials, Mike Hornblow 
of the State Department’s Pakistan desk denied strike plans were in place but 
conjectured that Burt might have misunderstood ‘unknown individuals’ who were 
speculating about Indian or Israeli military action.150  American rebuttals failed to 																																																								
145 USE Islamabad to SD, ‘Letter from President Zia-ul-Haq to President Carter,’ 14 August 1979, JCPL, R[ecords of 
the] N[ational] S[ecurity] S[taff], Box 96, P[akistan:] P[residential] C[orrespondence:] 1-12/79. 
146 Zia to Carter, Letter, 9 August 1979, JCPL, RNSS, Box 96, PPC 1-12/79, 2, 4. 
147 Tarnoff to Brzezinski, ‘Letter of August 9 from President Zia of Pakistan to President Carter,’ 27 August 1979, 
JCPL, RNSS, Box 96, PPC 1-12/79, 1; Tarnoff to Brzezinski, ‘Response to Letter of August 9 and September 29 
from President Zia of Pakistan to President Carter,’ 10 October 1979, JCPL, RNSS, Box 96, PPC 1-12/79; Zia to 
Carter, Letter, 29 September 1979, JCPL, RNSS, Box 96, PPC 1-12/79, 2. 
148 Fabian to Lavers, ‘Pakistan Nuclear,’ 30 July 1979, TNA FCO 96/957, 1; Came to Gould, Untitled, 30 July 1979, 
TNA FCO37/2206. 
149 Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Release, 14 August 1979, TNA FCO96/958. 
150 Fortescue to Holloway, ‘US/Pakistan,’ 14 August 1979, TNA FCO96/958. 
	 35	
prevent a stern rebuke from the Pakistani government, which castigated the Burt article 
and the CBS report as part of a campaign to incite ‘Israel, India, and even the Soviet 
Union to destroy Pakistan’s budding nuclear facilities.’151 Such was the Pakistani 
response, diplomats opined that there was likely to be lasting damage to bilateral 
relations and a reduction in the scope for ‘rational dialogue’ on the nuclear issue.152 
Pakistan’s ambassador to Britain attacked the media speculation as inspired by the US 
government, the suggestion of an ‘Islamic bomb’ prompting him to ask: ‘why should 
Pakistan, which depended a great deal on economic support from its Islamic friends, so 
exacerbate the Arab/Israel situation as to threaten the continuation of this help[?]’153 Zia 
expanded upon this theme when British parliamentarians visited Pakistan, treating them 
to a tirade on the ‘American conspiracy’ and the ‘myth of an Islamic bomb.’154 
Within the US General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament 
(GAC), there was speculation that it was the Israelis – supposedly working on a plan 
named ‘Entebbe 2’ – who were most motivated to strike at Pakistani nuclear facilities 
out of fear of Middle Eastern proliferation.155 ACDA’s Charles van Doren noted that 
Burt had made things a lot harder for the US. While military options had not been under 
consideration, the categorical denials about the fracas issued by the State Department 
made it all the more difficult to ever consider such an option.156 
 Faced with Islamic opposition to the United States and a deteriorating situation 
in South Asia, in London the Cabinet saw attacks on the US embassy in Islamabad as 
evidence that ‘the influence of Islamic extremism’ was spreading from Iran to 																																																								
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Pakistan.157 Despite this, FCO observers opined that non-proliferation diplomacy 
relying upon generalisations about an ‘Islamic bomb’ could prove damaging rather than 
useful: ‘It seems dangerous, for instance, to put about suggestions of an ‘Islamic bomb’. 
In general, we think it would be a mistake to make quite sweeping generalisations 
without backing them up with proposals for action which might be taken to remedy the 
situation.’158 Here, the FCO displayed a nuanced view of the situation, recognising that 
lumping the entire Muslim world into a single monolithic group was counter-productive. 
Likewise, the British analysts argued that panicked fear-mongering of the kind seen in 
the media served no purpose without solutions to address the problem’s root causes. 
Finally, like many of their American counterparts, British policymakers saw financial 
incentives as a greater motivator for Pakistan to proliferate to countries such as Libya or 
Saudi Arabia than any sense of Islamic solidarity.159 The Islamic links posited in the 
Observer ‘Dr Khan’ article were, in the FCO’s view, so speculative as to be unworthy 
of comment.160 
Just as the ‘Islamic bomb’ became embedded in public discourses, the 
December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan forced rapid bridge-building between 
the West and the Islamic world. While covert governmental and overt Congressional 
pressure continued on Pakistan during the 1980s, the US and UK 
governments recognised that action against Pakistan was subservient to anti-Soviet 
action in Afghanistan. It was not enough to simply repair relations with Pakistan, but 
better relations between the West and the wider Muslim sphere were needed to foster a 
coalition against the USSR. Carter himself publically noted American ‘respect and 																																																								
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reverence for Islam and all those who share the faith of Islam.’161 Mention of the 
‘Islamic bomb’ required curtailing lest it create rifts in the emerging alliance between 
the ‘free world’ and the ‘Muslim world.’ As Andrew Preston argues, the assembling of 
an Islamic coalition to resist the Soviets was founded in a belief that this would ‘realign 
the Islamic world’s sympathies towards the United States.’162 Unlike the negative public 
image of the ‘Islamic bomb’, within government Islam was now viewed as a positive 
force for good in a reinvigorated Cold War. 
 
Conclusion 
When America and Britain engaged in anti-proliferation activity against Pakistan in the 
late 1970s, the historical record runs counter to popular belief. Contrary to alarmist 
analyses, the ‘Islamic bomb’ was seldom an important factor in American and British 
non-proliferation policy. While the media and peripheral politicians manufactured the 
‘reality’ of an ‘Islamic bomb’, governments level assessed the concept evidentially. 
Although some key individuals feared – and institutions such as the CIA investigated –
 the meme, the consensus was that it was a propaganda rather than a policy challenge. 
Thus, while Washington and London battled media representations of Pakistan’s 
nuclear aspirations as a pan-Islamic project, policymaking carried on as normal. What 
this propaganda problem did do was change public perceptions of Pakistani atomic 
aspirations geopolitically, from a regional South Asian problem to a much wider 
problem encompassing the Middle East, with all the challenges that implied. For the 
American and British governments, it was the publicity surrounding pan-Islamic nuclear 
capability and the perception this created, not belief in the reality of an ‘Islamic bomb’ 
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 The ‘Islamic bomb’ meme has become an abiding feature of discussions 
surrounding the nuclear ambitions of Muslim states. Throughout the 1980s and into the 
1990s, the ‘Islamic bomb’ frequently and repeatedly emerged as shorthand for an 
aggressive, confrontational ‘Islamic’ quest for power.163 The meme was founded in the 
rhetoric of Pakistani leaders seeking to justify – and gain sympathy and support for – 
their nuclear ambitions. Bhutto and Zia presented this ‘official conspiracy’ as a means 
to an end, the rhetoric becoming intertwined with the genuine conspiracy represented by 
the Khan Affair, snowballing into a ritualised media trope that resonates up to the 
present day. Those in government who knew more about the Khan conspiracy than the 
public struggled to find any evidence for an Islamic dimension to Pakistani nuclear 
desires and those who posit conspiracy theories about an ‘Islamic bomb’ in the twenty-
first century would do well to consider the events of 1977-80. 
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